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Who Pays for Progress? Accident Law in
Florida, 1845-1886
by James L. Hunt
ew residents of twenty-first-century Florida are unfamiliar
with the notion of legal liability for accidental injuries. The
image of the "ambulance chasing" attorney, the call for "tort
reform," and a recurring medical malpractice insurance "crisis"

F

are well-known to the casual observer of affairs. In fact, much of
the modern business of Florida trial courts concerns automobile

accidents, injuries from products, and professional malpra
In 2000-2001, approximately 35,000 such cases were filed i
state's circuit courts, roughly 23 percent of all civil cases. Ab
2,000 involved professional malpractice, 4,600 products liabili
and 17,000 automobile accidents.1 Despite its current pro
nence, legal responsibility for accidental injury to persons or

erty is not a new phenomenon. Since 1845, individuals,

companies, and the state have been confronted with the need to

create and implement rules that address accidentally caused
James L. Hunt is Associate Professor of Law in the Eugene W. Stetson School of
Business and Economics and the Walter F. George School of Law at Mercer
University in Macon, Ga.
1. These numbers are significant, but they constitute only a small part of the
caseload in Florida trial courts, which amounted to almost 2.8 million civil

and criminal filings in 2000-2001. Even within the subcategory of civil cases
in the circuit courts, most were disputes over contracts, not accidental injury.
Criminal, juvenile, and domestic cases (divorce and child custody, e.g.) are of

much greater numerical importance in modern Florida than accident cases.
Florida Office of State Courts Administration, Statistical Reference Guide:
Florida's Trial Courts, 2000-2001 (Tallahassee, Fla., 2002), sec.l: 2, 5; sec. 3: 1,

3, 9, 10.
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death, maiming, and property damage. The persistent quest
has been, "Who should pay for unintended injuries to persons
property?"
One answer has been the legal doctrine of negligence. In gen-

eral, negligence rules are not complex. Liability based on negligence is determined by whether the person's action or inaction
was "unreasonable" or lacking in "ordinary care" under the circumstances. In order to recover damages, an injured person must

also show that there was a sufficient causal connection between the

unreasonable action and any injury. Under the rule of "contributory negligence," the injurer's responsibility might be diminished

or even eliminated if the injured person acted unreasonably.

Although the legal principles are straightforward, their application

to real disputes has often raised difficult problems. During th
past 150 years, lawyers and judges have written volumes about the
meaning of "negligence" in specific contexts. Predictably, given
the uniqueness of each accident and the economic costs at stake,

judges, legislatures, and juries have expressed contrasting view
about who should bear the costs of injuries.2
The law of accidents and its history should not concern only
judges, juries, lawyers, legal scholars, or the injured. Historians of
all kinds can learn a great deal about the priorities of governmen
and the patterns of shifting social and economic relations: how a
society defines and treats victims of harm and the persons who
cause harm is an important measure of its social, economic, an
political values. Florida historians, however, have not fully inte-

grated this story into the state's past. As a result, this article seek

to shed light on life and law in nineteenth-century Florida by

describing the state's experience with accidental injuries between

1845 and 1886. It explores the decisions of Florida's Supreme

Court, accident cases in several of the state's trial courts, and the

actions of the state legislature. The special characteristics of nineteenth-century Florida provide unique grounds on which to use
legal history to evaluate political, social, and economic conditions
in the early history of the state.3
2. On the essential elements of negligence, see Dan D. Dobbs, The Law of Torts

(St. Paul, Minn., 2000), 269-73.
3. Florida legal history is fortunate in that several fine studies address its state
and federal courts. See Walter W. Manley II, E. Canter Brown, and Eric W.
Rise, The Supreme Court of Florida and its Predecessor Courts, 1821-1917
(Gainesville, Fla., 1997); Kermit L. Hall and Eric W. Rise, From Local Courts to
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No legal system develops in a social and e

and Florida's has been no exception. A critical
the low degree of urbanization, mechanized
industry. Although permanent European settl
1560s, for the next three hundred years immi
largely restricted to the peninsula's northern

ted to the Union in 1845, there were no to

Jacksonville contained just over 1,000 souls in
counted less than 3,000. Nonetheless, the rate o
teen years before and after statehood was sub

lation grew from 34,000 in 1830 to about 1

state's first economy was almost entirely agri
slavery and livestock particularly important.
poorly, and compared to other southern state

ment progressed at a snail's pace. This econ

critical to understanding accident law. Outside
development, including railroads, was the mos
of accidental injury to persons and property. S
its great benefits, caused death, personal injury
age. Yet, little railroad mileage was constructe
1860, and much of it covered only short dista
and gulf traffic, some of it steam-driven, rem

National Tribunals: The Federal District Courts of Florida
N.Y., 1991); James M. Denham, "A Rouge's Paradise". Cr
Antebellum Florida (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1997). A broad dis
is beyond the scope of any of these books, however; s
et al., Supreme Court of Florida, 180-81; Hall and Rise

National Tribunals, 47. Two other studies that addr
Florida's legal history are James M. Denham, "From

Judiciary: Florida's Antebellum Courts and Judges," Flori

73 (April 1995): 443-55; Robert B. Lewis, "Railroad

Supreme Court, 1845-1887," Florida Supreme Court Hist

(winter 1985): 3-5, 10-12. The nature and purpose of
erated considerable heat and light among legal histori
little of this learning has been incorporated into the
historians outside that specialty. Some of the contour

gleaned from Lawrence M. Friedman and Thomas D
Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation, 1901-1910," Ame
History 34 (July 1990): 296-414; Morton Horwitz, T
American Law, 1780-1860 (New York, 1977), 85-99; G
Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America
(July 1981): 1717-75; John F. Witt, "Toward a New
Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative
Movement," Harvard Law Review 14 (January 2001): 69
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means of long-distance transportation. Altogether, slavery,

dominance of agriculture, the lack of urban areas, and the persi
ence of a water-based transportation system shaped the state's e
liest experiences with accidental injuries.4

Between 1845 and 1865, the clearest legal effect of Florid
undeveloped economy was that the use of negligence law conce
was infrequent, both in the state's trial courts and in the Flor
Supreme Court. A review of circuit court minute books and ot

trial court records from Escambia, Marion, Leon, Gadsden,

Madison, and Hillsborough Counties during the first two decades
of statehood reveals few cases that might have been based on acc

dental harm. All of these counties maintained "minute books" of

the circuit courts, which listed the names of cases and any disp
tion by the court. They also signified the type of case by noting
technical name for its pleading, the form in which the dispute
presented to the court. The typical form of pleading for an ac

dent case in antebellum Florida was "trespass on the case."

Unfortunately, the "trespass on the case" pleading was sometimes

used in cases involving facts other than accidents. Still, it was
apparent from the minute books that all uses of "trespass on the
case" were rare, suggesting claims based on negligence were infrequent. They were certainly insignificant compared to the flood of

criminal prosecutions and disputes over debt that dominated
Florida's circuit courts. Civil disputes in Florida usually involved
breaches of contract and competing claims to property ownership.
The new railroad companies occasionally appeared as participants
in cases, but generally as debtors or creditors.5

4. The frontier nature of pre-Civil War Florida is surveyed in Michael Gannon,
ed., The New History of Florida (Gainesville, Fla., 1996), 40-230; Charlton W.
Tebeau, A History of Florida (Coral Gables, Fla., 1971), 133-98. On the limitations of early Florida railroads, see Gregg Turner, A Short History of Florida
Railroads (Charleston, S.C., 2003), 12-32; George W. Pettengill Jr., The Story of
the Florida Railroads, 1834-1903 (Boston, 1952), 10-28.
5. An impediment to trial-level research is that nineteenth-century court records
are stored by county clerks rather than at the state archives, producing widely varying circumstances of maintenance and access. Altogether, I contacted

clerk's offices in Escambia (Pensacola), Franklin (Apalachicola), Gadsden
(Quincy), Leon (Tallahassee), Jefferson (Monticello), Madison (Madison),
Columbia (Lake City), Alachua (Gainesville), Duval (Jacksonville), St. Johns
(St. Augustine), Marion (Ocala), Hillsborough (Tampa), and Monroe (Key

West) Counties about nineteenth-century trial court records. Several offices,
including those in Duval, Columbia, and Franklin, reported that their records

for the years before 1880 had been destroyed. Others had real difficulty

ACCIDENT LAW IN FLORIDA 133

Despite the infrequency of accident cla

files in Escambia and Marion Counties indicate that antebellum

Florida lawyers were well aware of the negligence concept.

Goodman v. Ramsey, an 1851 Pensacola case, the plaintiff claim
he lost $600 worth of lumber when the defendants "negligentl

carelessly, and improperly conducted themselves." In Shield
Pendleton, heard in 1859 also in Pensacola, the plaintiff sou

damages for hides lost in a wrecked ship. Another shipping cas
was Howard v. McGahagan, decided in Marion County just befo

the Civil War. There the defendant warehouse owner, accord-

ing to Howard, "carelessly and negligently conducted themselves" so as to destroy $1,200 worth of cotton. Importantly, all
of these cases involved losses in commercial contexts, specifical-

ly in the transportation of goods-lumber, hides, and cotton-

to market.6

Naturally, the lack of accident litigation extended to the
antebellum supreme court, which depended on the trial courts
for its business. During the 1840s and 1850s, there was not a sin-

gle reported appeal in Florida involving a negligently caused

injury among persons or companies lacking a prior business rela-

tionship. Nor were there any personal injury cases, including
employee injury cases. There were not any appeals involving
damage to either livestock-a critical part of the Florida economy-or to persons resulting from railroad collisions. Moreover,
the Florida Supreme Court did not address in any depth the

standard of liability for freight carriers, a hot and common dis-

identifying what they might have. A few counties, including Escambia and
Marion, have preserved both minute books and a significant number of orig-

inal case files with pleadings and evidence. Alachua County has placed a

huge variety of its records on the clerk's web page, making them available
around the globe; see http://www.clerk-alachua-fl.org/clerk. I also consulted copies ofJustice Court (a small claims court) documents for Hillsborough
County (1850-1885) in the Special Collections Department at the University
of South Florida Library, Tampa. For a good discussion of antebellum trial
courts and their records, see Denham, A Rogue's Paradise, 24-58, 212-13, 33941. A succinct presentation of the highly technical question of "trespass" and
nineteenth-century pleading in accident cases is Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 25-

27, 259-63.
6. Goodman v. Ramsey, file no. 2054, and Shield v. Pendleton, file no. 3515, both in

Escambia County Clerk's Office, Pensacola, Fla.; Howard v. McGahagan, file
no. 1657, and Howard v. McGahagan, Marion County Circuit Court Minutes, 1
May 1860, both in Marion County Clerk's Office, Ocala, Fla.
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pute in neighboring states. As a result, the rural and agricultural condition of the state delayed the full development of negligence law before 1865.7

Nonetheless, the antebellum supreme court did consider a
few cases involving accidental injury. In fact, its earliest con-

frontations with liability for accidents provide strong evidence of

how American law drifted across state borders. One subtle influence was the fact that Florida in the 1840s and 1850s was a state

of immigrants, a condition that of course applied to its jud
The forces propelling the importation of law were so strong t

they occurred despite limited printed resources. In the 18
the supreme court confessed, "Unfortunately, we have no
[access] to [law] books, and particularly those bearing most
directly on the points [at issue], and are confined, in some
degree, to digests."s The "Catalogue of Books" in the state's judicial library reflected the primitive state of Florida's law libraries
at late as 1861. The court possessed incomplete reports, digests,
and statutes from other states, some federal reports and statutes,
and a few treatises, altogether less than a few hundred volumes.
Given that the state library was probably the best law library in
Florida, it is not surprising that many of the court's early opin-

ions dealing with accidental injury relied on presumed general
principles of law.9

The antebellum supreme court considered accidental
injuries in several contexts. Its first cases arose out of situations

involving special agreements or public duties. The small number of these appeals addressed the obligations of attorneys,1'

7. In Bennett v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403 (1847), an early decision involving the loss of
three boxes of tobacco on a steamboat, the supreme court defined common
carriers to include steamboats and certain ferries for hire. The court held, in
upholding liability against a steamboat owner, that the burden was on him to
demonstrate that "in virtue of some special public notice, or other good legal
ground" that he was not liable as a common carrier. The rule governing the
liability of carriers was liability without negligence, or fault, the traditional

common law doctrine. The lost tobacco was carried on the Appalachicola
River to Appalachicola in December 1842.
8. Kelly v. Wallace, 6 Fla. 690, 707 (1856).
9. Supplement, 10 Fla. at I-VIII.
10. Hale v. Crowell's Admr., 2 Fla. 534 (1849), a curious Leon County case involving a disputed contract, addressed the "negligence" of an attorney who
obtained a default judgment which was actually to the disadvantage of his
clients. The court allowed the default to be reversed. Waterson v. Seat and
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cities,11 and parties in bailments,12 with

southern states, primarily involving injuries
Slave hire accidents were the most frequen

accidental injury considered by the Florid

legal rules governing the slave cases were sim
in other southern jurisdictions. For example

ing a slave, Esop, who died while hired to
Pensacola and Georgia Rail-Road in Leon C
announced that "Courts of the Southern S

the question as to what shall constitute negl
a slave, have justly and humanely defined the

Crawford, 10 Fla. 326 (1864), a dispute over own

Hillsborough County, provided that the "negligence"
the basis of an action for damages by the attorney's c
11. Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1850), a case in whi
sued for property damage, involved a gully in a pub
death of the plaintiffs horse. The plaintiff tied the
shop in the town, but the horse got loose, was injure
reveals that the plaintiff sought $200 for "trespass o
the city was "in no wise ignorant of the premises, bu
duty in this behalf' by not filling the ditch. The c
municipal corporation it could not be liable for tresp
had negligently tied the horse. The "contributory n
tiff-his failure to act with "ordinary care"-the city s
recovery. The supreme court, however, held that t
that under its charter Tallahassee had the power t
that it was therefore obligated to remove nuisances a
plaintiff unless the injury to the horse occurred by
negligence, which was defined as an absence of "or
found the plaintiff was not negligent because horses

hitchings, and this horse was likely trying to get back
ment against the defendant city was affirmed; Tallah

Supreme Court Folder 0854, Florida State Archives, T

12. A bailment is the delivery of personal property

trust to be used by the bailee for some particular pu
This was the legal arrangement for the hiring of slav
personal property. In Ferguson v. Porter, 3 Fla. 27, 38
that a bailee who receives no benefit from a bailmen
negligence." In contrast, a bailee who benefits from
as someone who hires a slave, is to act with "diligenc
failed to follow the instructions of the property own
injury to the property. Ferguson involved a business
County in which Porter agreed to ship arrowroot to
shipped it to Charleston where it was lost. The trial
the defendant, but the supreme court reversed on t
of the defendant was not properly considered. The
in law is addressed at length in Thomas D. Morris, Sout

(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996), 132-58.
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to bestow that degree of care and attention which a kind and

humane master would bestow under the circumstances."13 In
another dispute, involving the drowning of a hired slave, Peter, at
a lumber mill in Duval County, the court imposed a duty on the
slave hirer to not subject a slave to work for which he was not fit.
Peter was sent into an area of the mill where the water was up to
eight feet deep, but he could not swim. The court affirmed a finding of liability in the trial court.14

The most important case involving the liability of slave hirers
was Forsyth & Simpson v. Perry, in which the court refused to apply
13. Tallahassee R.R. Co. v. Macon, 8 Fla. 299, 304 (1859). Esop was sub-leased by
the defendant to the Pensacola and Georgia Railroad, apparently a common
practice; Larry E. Rivers, Slavery in Florida (Gainesville, Fla., 2000), 30-32, 8081. The core of the claim was that Esop fell ill, and the railroad failed to provide medical care. The railroad responded that it allowed Esop to stop work
when he did not feel well (he was ramming dirt under new cross-ties), gave

him alcohol, pills, and a visit from a physician. The parties quibbled over
Esop's age, as it naturally affected the damages. Esop's owner claimed he was

between forty and forty-five years of age and valued at $1,500; the railroad said

he was an old man only worth $300. The court affirmed a verdict for the

plaintiff for $600; Tallahassee R.R. Co. v. Macon, Florida Supreme Court Folder
0853, Florida State Archives. In McRaeny v. Johnson & Moore, 2 Fla. 520, 527
(1849), the court stated, apparently without any sense of irony, "In cases of
injury to this species of property [slaves], the American courts, by a spirit of
enlightened humanity, have extended a more enlarged protection than prevails in cases of mere chattels." Of course, the slave in all of these cases was
either dead or injured, and at any rate could not benefit from any damages
that instead went to owners. In fact, in McRaeny, a white man beat the slave
Sam to death. The lawsuit was about who owned Sam and therefore who had

the right to compensation for his death.

14. Kelly v. Wallace, 6 Fla. 690, 704-705. The mill owner beat and otherwi

harassed Peter and routinely sent him to recover logs in deep water although
he knew Peter could not swim. The trial judge charged thejury that the claim
was based on "negligence and want of ordinary care," and that a key question
was whether the slave received an order that "no ordinary prudent man woul
have given"; Kelly v. Wallace, Florida Supreme Court Folder 0776, Florida Stat
Archives. Another slave bailment case, originally filed in 1860, was Pensacol

& Georgia R.R v. Nash, 12 Fla. 497 (1869). A slave, Jackson, was hired as a
locomotive fireman. He was ordered to jump from the locomotive and attac
a rope to a moving train as it pulled into Tallahassee from St. Marks. He fel
while getting back on the locomotive, and the engine crushed his foot. After
its amputation, Jackson's leg became infected and he died of "lockjaw." The
slave's owner argued that Jackson was hired only as a fireman and was no

hired for the more dangerous job of coupling and uncoupling cars. Th

defendant claimed that it was all Jackson's fault. He was not ordered to try t

get back on the moving locomotive. That was his negligent decision and
should bar any recovery. The supreme court accepted the latter argumen

and reversed an $1,800jury verdict for the plaintiff; Pensacola and Georgia R.R.

Co. v. Nash, Florida Supreme Court Folder 0837, Florida State Archives.
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the fellow servant rule. The rule, well establish

provided that a worker could not recover dama
injury was caused by the negligence of a "fell
worker.15 Given that any injury of a worker
result of errors of "fellow servants," the rule

tial barrier to recovery. In Perry, a slave in

drowned while attempting to follow an order

boat from a flatboat. The slave tried but fell into the water and

drowned.'6 In his defense, the boat owner argued that the ma
not the owner, was negligent.'7 The court interpreted this as
argument that the employer was not responsible for the action
his employees, and that workers in general assumed all ris
injury or death resulting from the negligence of fellow servan

Although the court agreed the rule applied to free worker

rejected its application to a case involving a slave, reasoning t
"[u]nlike white persons, the slave does not, upon entering into
service of another, voluntarily incur the risks and dangers inc
to such service."19 Further,
The [fellow servant] rule applies to [free] persons neces-

sarily-those who are competent to contract, and who,

while they are responsible for the consequences of their

own misconduct, have the same rights and remedies as

their co-agents. Why [include] slaves, when it is manifest
they have none of those rights or remedies against others,

and are not liable in a civil suit for their own acts and mis-

conduct? Apart from the views we have presented, considerations of public policy, the interest of the master, and

humanity to the slave, require that [the slave] should

be shielded from the unrestricted control and oppression
of irresponsible subordinates. The liability of the employer ... , for the misconduct of his subordinates, will naturally add to the personal security and protection of the

slave.20

15. Forsyth & Simpson v. Perry, 5 Fla. 337 (1853). On slaves as fellow servants, see
Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 147-58.
16. Forsyth & Simpson v. Perry, 5 Fla. at 341.
17. Ibid., 5 Fla. at 341-42.

18. Ibid., 5 Fla. at 342. The only citation was to Joseph Story's Commentaries on the
Law of Agency (Boston, 1839).
19. Forsyth & Simpson v. Perry, 5 Fla. at 343.

20. Ibid., 5 Fla. at 343-45.
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In the court's mind, it was more "humane" in this context to view

slaves as property than persons.21
Courts were not the only part of Florida's government concerned with accidents. Before the Civil War, the state legislature
passed a number of statutes dealing with the potential for injury.
Most important, in 1859 and 1861, it adopted laws describing what
should happen when railroads killed or injured livestock, suggesting that livestock was already being killed by locomotives. Florida
was a common pasturage jurisdiction; owners of roaming livestock

could let their herds range freely over others' property.
Landowners wishing to keep livestock out of their land had the
legal burden of "fencing out" the animals. Otherwise, they could
not complain about damages caused by foraging livestock.
Showing a desire to protect the free-range property right, the general assembly challenged the use of a negligence standard in this

context. Its statutes provided that railroad companies "shall pay
for all cattle and other live stock killed" regardless of any need to

prove fault by the company. The laws established a process of
informal application to the railroad companies for payment.
Further, engineers and conductors were required to report all livestock injuries to their employers, and the railroads were charged

with keeping public records of all livestock accidents.22 The

statutes clearly intended to protect the state's livestock interests by
making it easier to impose liability on the new railroads.
Altogether, the infrequent application of accident law in antebellum Florida was caused by a lack of urban, industrial, and transportation development. The economic context of the few decided
cases-lost goods on a steamboat, killed slaves hired out to a lumber mill or a ship owner, Tallahassee's poor streets, and the mis-

takes of attorneys-suggests the relevance of the urban and
industrial capacity to kill or to damage property. Yet, there was not

much that was either urban or industrial in early Florida, evidenced especially by the general absence of railroads. Moreover,
the few disputes addressing liability for accidental harm arose out
of existing legal relationships: carriers and shippers, bailors and
bailees, cities and citizens, and attorneys and their clients. All of
the earliest disputes involved injury to property, often slaves. The

21. Ibid., 5 Fla. at 344.

22. Digest of the Statute Law of Florida (Tallahassee, Fla., 1872), 125-27.
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general assembly's interest in accidents was
and livestock. In pre-Civil War Florida, person
ing out of accidents were simply not a mean

the state's law.

In this environment both the general assembly and the
supreme court did not mind crafting rules that held injurers of
property liable. In fact, under Florida law livestock killings by railroads and injury to property on common carriers such as steamboats resulted in liability even without the fault of the defendant.
Similarly, the supreme court did not apply the fellow servant rule
to slaves, and towns and attorneys were held liable for their negligence. The willingness to impose responsibility, however, was not
the result of any animus toward modern devices. Florida's legislature actively participated in the development of railroads, and in
1859, the supreme court proclaimed that "Railroads in cities and
towns cannot with propriety be termed nuisances. ... They are in
use in the principal cities of Europe and this country, and, when
regulated by proper restrictions, are valuable aids to commerce."23
Instead, accident law in early Florida tried to balance the interests
of old and new forms of property, seeking a middle ground among
slave owners, boat owners, the new railroads, and livestock owners

that held injurers to account in an environment in which personal injury was not a factor and the overall numbers of claims was
small.

The antebellum liability system did not last, however, as economic transformation between 1865 and 1886 changed the meaning of accident law in Florida. Slave hires, which had generated
the most common kind of pre-Civil War accident case, ended with
Emancipation. After a series of setbacks related to railroad line
destruction during the Civil War and financial corruption during

Reconstruction, railroads expanded at an unprecedented pace.

Between 1880 and 1885, railroad mileage increased from less than

500 to more than 1,650. The total was just under 2,500 in 1890.
The number of Floridians also grew, if slowly. In 1880, the state's
population was less than 270,000, one of the lowest in the federal

union. No place had more than 10,000 persons, including
23. Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325, 332 (1859). For a discussion of state sponsorship of
railroad construction before and after the Civil War and the personal financial interests of supreme court justices in internal improvements, see Lewis,
"Railroad Cases in the Florida Supreme Court," 3-5, 10.
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Jacksonville, Pensacola, and Key West, the leading towns. Tampa
counted less than 1,000.24 Nonetheless, legislators and judges gave
increased attention to the injuries that resulted from improvements in transportation.

As before the Civil War, the supreme court decided several
lawsuits involving goods destroyed while being transported.
Damages to goods shipped on railroads produced appeals for the

first time. One such case, heard in 1872, arose when shoes,
clothes, and furniture shipped from New York to Gainesville were
lost. The court reversed a trial verdict against the Florida Railroad

Company on the ground that the more than $700 awarded was
excessive.25 In another appeal, a dentist's implements valued at
more than $500 were lost on a steamer in the St. Johns River. The
supreme court, however, refused the plaintiff compensation for his
inability to practice dentistry and also denied any special recovery
for the tools, which allegedly were set with gold, diamonds, and
rubies.26 In contrast, in Southern Express Co. v. Van Meter, the court

held an express company in Alachua County liable for a misdelivered package under the prevailing strict liability standard for common carriers.27 Altogether, the results in the carrier cases were
primarily determined by the terms of agreement between the ship-

per and carrier. The contractual basis of carrier liability law in
Florida, as opposed to negligence, was recognized in an 1885
statute requiring common carriers to deliver freight strictly according to their agreements with the shipper, whether represented by
a bill of lading or some other document.28
A second type of property case, the accidental killing of livestock by railroads, had received the legislature's attention before
the Civil War. After the war, the issue of liability for livestock
killings produced a dramatic and well-defined contest between the

legislature and the supreme court. The conflict was predictable.
Divisions in Florida politics frequently resulted from disagree-

24. Turner, A Short History of Florida Railroads, 33-92; Pettengill, The Story of the
Florida Railroads, 8; Gannon, ed., The New History of Florida, 249-86. On the

general failure of Florida's railroads to expand between 1865 and 1880, see

Edward C. Williamson, Florida Politics in the Gilded Age, 1877-1893 (Gainesville,
Fla., 1976), 7-8, 15-16, 30-31; Manley et al., The Supreme Court of Florida, 261.

25. Florida R.R. v. Gensler & Silberstein, 14 Fla. 122 (1872).
26. Brock v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523 (1874).
27. Southern Express Company v. Van Meter, 17 Fla. 783 (1880).

28. Revised Statutes of the State of Florida (Jacksonville, Fla., 1892), s. 2348.
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ments about the legal status of railroads, an
farmers and the railroads in livestock cases
larger contest.29 Property in livestock was
of the yeoman farmer, a class that possess
clout in late nineteenth-century Florida. A

owner had long held an established prop

range of his animals. Further, prior to th

legislature endorsed both an abbreviated

road liability for livestock killings even wi

the railroad.

After the Civil War, the growth of railroads produced more
livestock accidents, and for the first time the property rights of the

farmer became subject to evaluation in the supreme court. During
the 1870s, the state's Reconstruction legislature passed a provision

that made it illegal to allow any animals to stray onto railroad
tracks. With Republicans in retreat as Reconstruction ended, a
Conservative-Democratic legislature overturned this potentially

radical pro-railroad change by providing that companies "shall be
held liable" for damages to livestock caused "by the cars or trains
of such company." Proof of damages could be provided by affidavit of the owner, reaffirming antebellum principles.30 The leg-

islature also permitted levies on railroad property and
garnishment of railroad depot agents in order to collect damages
for livestock injuries. Still, the legislature repealed former provisions requiring informal claims before instituting a lawsuit in a

court.31

The legislature's preference for railroad liability was not tested
in the supreme court until 1886 with Savannah, Florida and Western
Ry. Co. v. Geiger. Florida statutory law provided that railroads "shall
be held liable" for injuries to stock.32 Geiger involved a claim for
damages to livestock in Nassau County for which the plaintiff won
a verdict at trial. Yet, Geiger was not simply a contest over a few ani-

29. According to Edward C. Williamson, arguments over the financial and political power of railroads, especially those controlled by out-of-state interests,
were at the forefront of state politics after 1880; Florida Politics in the Gilded Age,
144-62, 193.

30. Digest of the Laws of the State of Florida (Tallahassee, Fla., 1881), 125-26, 856;
Savannah, Florida and Western Ry. Co. v. Geiger, 21 Fla. 669, 685-86 (1886).
31. Digest of the Laws of the State of Florida, 125-26, 856.
32. Savannah, Florida and Western Ry. Co., 21 Fla. 669; Digest of the Laws of the State
of Forida, 356.
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mals. It confronted the supreme court with the larger question of
the relative property rights of farmers and industry and who would
be asked to bear the costs of modernization. Few policy questions
in a capitalist economy were more important than the definition of

relative property rights. Farmer Geiger's predicament was

undoubtedly common. Ten of his cattle, two sheep, and five hogs

were killed by the railroad in less than a year. Fed up, he proceeded to court on the evidence of carcasses found alongside the
tracks and claimed roughly $150 in damages. His claim relied on
ancient property rights as well as the livestock statute: "The custom of the County is that stock grase [sic] in the woods wherever

they please, and it was the same custom before the [Savannah,
Florida & Western] was built." From the beginning, the key legal

question was the standard of liability. The railroad maintained
that the claim failed because there was no allegation of negligence.
Geiger responded, "[T]here is no law requiring him to set out or
prove negligence." The trial court, following the livestock statute,
agreed with Geiger and instructed the jury that the killings were

prima facie evidence of negligence. The jury awarded Geiger

$146.33

Savannah, Florida & Western Railway appealed to the supreme
court. Robert Davis, a Jacksonville attorney who represented the
railroad, prepared an elaborate six-page printed brief in which he

argued that negligence could not be presumed; it had to be

proven by the plaintiff. He attacked the livestock statute as imposing unfair punishment when there was no evidence of fault. The
statute "attempts to hold all railroad companies in this State liable
for damages to live stock on their roads absolutely, and provides an
ex parte method of proving the amount of the damage by the affidavit of a witness." According to Davis, this violated economic efficiency because "it would be absolutely impossible for the engineers

to run their trains so as to make half the time now universally
required by the traveling public without occasionally killing an ani-

mal." He believed the law considered the "efficient operation of
railroads" to be of much more importance "than the avoiding of
injury to live-stock." As a result, locomotives were not required to
slow down when livestock was seen. Economics aside, according to

33. Savannah, Florida, and Western Ry. Co. v. Geiger, Florida Supreme Court Folder
0808, Florida State Archives.
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Davis, the statute was invalid because of the

ments of the federal and Florida constitutions. As a matter of con-

stitutional law, the legislature could not impose liability without
fault. It could not take the property of one person and give it to

another without proof of negligence. Davis conceded that live

stock owners would probably not be able to prove negligence very
often, given that all that would be left after a killing would be a rot-

ting carcass. Yet, the "law is the law, work a hardship on whom i
may." Further, because 90 percent of these cases were for small

amounts and brought before justices of the peace, where ther
were no written pleadings, the companies were unable to adequately defend claims under the current standard. Altogether
economic efficiency, due process, and the informal procedura
context (which hampered railroad defense strategies) required

negligence standard.34
Geiger's response, handwritten by his attorney on three pages,
put the matter in a different light. It maintained that the legislature clearly intended to change the common law negligence rule:
"[A]1 the Plaintiff has to prove is the killing[,] the value of prop
erty[,] and ownership which make a prima facie case." Still, th
burden was on the defendant to prove the killing was unavoidable,

reflecting the sound policy that railroads should "Exercise th

utmost care and diligence in the Exercise of their privilege." On a
practical level, the legislature's rule was just common sense. The

company had at least two witnesses-the fireman and the engi

neer-present at every killing, while the "Plaintiff is at his house
following his daily business." As a result, the plaintiff could never

produce evidence of negligence. Further, according to Geiger,

the plaintiff was never at fault while the railroad always caused th
killing. Surely the legislature had the power to take such matters
into consideration when devising a rule of responsibility.35
The court took its time in reaching a decision. Anxiously, the
railroad contacted the court's clerk several times, and on

November 16, 1885, Attorney Davis rather oddly requested that
soon as the case is decided you will send us a copy of the decisi
provided the decision is in favor of the Rail Road Company, wh
I have every reason to believe will be the case." He need not ha

been concerned. The supreme court's decision began with a
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
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cussion of fence laws in territorial Florida, which since 1823 rec-

ognized "a right in resident owners of stock for their cattle and
other domestic animals to range and graze on all uninclosed lands
free of change, and without any liability for any damage resulting

from their going upon or grazing on any lands whatsoever not
inclosed by a lawful fence." The court concluded, "No special
interest is of as much if any more moment to our State, and none

elicited earlier legislative attention than stock raising.""36 The
court believed the current livestock liability statute, passed in 1875,
did not impose any legal duty on livestock owners to keep their animals off railroad tracks. Despite this background, the court reject-

ed the liability standard articulated by the legislature. It
maintained that liability for livestock killings depended on
whether both parties exercised proper care and that the plaintiff
must prove the defendant's negligence in order to prevail.

The Geiger ruling defended the negligence principle, as
opposed to liability without fault. It defined negligence as "rea-

sonable care under the circumstances" and stated there could be

no recovery if the livestock killing could not have been avoide
the railroad or was caused by the plaintiffs own negligence.
court disagreed with Geiger's idea that the burden of disprov

negligence should be on the railroad. It assumed that eve

though a railroad might be dangerous, it was nonetheless law

and its lawfulness acted as notice to the livestock owner that the

state would tolerate its dangers. The court considered but even
ally rejected a rule that presumed the negligence of a railroad

livestock cases, a rule common before the Civil War in some south-

ern states. Instead, in "running at ordinary speed, [a railroad] is
doing nothing forbidden, but the very thing required by its organ-

ization and required by the commerce of the country."37

Moreover, the court concluded that Florida's statutes did not

impose a presumption of negligence.38 The court dismissed the
notion that the applicable statute, with its "shall be held liable" lan-

guage, could possibly impose liability without fault. Citing the
Michigan jurist Thomas Cooley's writings on limitations on legislative powers, it held that such a standard would violate constitu-

36. Ibid.; Savannah, Florida, and Western Ry. Co., 21 Fla. at 684.
37. Savannah, Florida, and Western Ry. Co., 21 Fla. at 689-96.
38. Ibid., 21 Fla. at 697-700.
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tional due process: "The legislature cannot th
even as to the single element of the amount
the basis of an ex-parte affidavit, nor as to
ing] those of the killing or injury and neglig
The court's reference to due process and t
substantive due process constitutional right

railroad corporation could be held liable. T
clusion was not really explained. The opin

whether it derived the right from the federal c

constitution, or both, as no specific provi

Nonetheless, the supreme court's citation to C
willing to imply a substantive due process rig
corporation from the federal Fourteenth Am
1886 Geiger decision predated the important

the United States Supreme Court between

established substantive due process as a feder
regulation of business. Equally remarkably
without explanation that a corporation as we
was entitled to constitutional protections, alt

Amendment was adopted to protect the c
slaves, not incorporated businesses. That c
addressed in the United States Supreme C
several months after Geiger.40

Analysis of the decision is noteworthy in
issued by a Democratic and ex-Confederate
expect such men to have little sympathy for
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a product
Reconstruction, but apparently their interes
ment overcame any possible doubts. The com

had changed dramatically in the months prec

sion. The new governor, former Confederate general and
Democrat Edward A. Perry, appointed Democrats George G.
McWhorter and George P. Raney to the court in 1885. McWhorter
was a leading figure in the West Florida faction of the party, a close
ally of William D. Chipley, manager of the Louisville & Nashville

39. A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of
the States of the American Union (Boston, 1874); Savannah, Florida, and Western

Ry. Co., 21 Fla. at 698-99.
40. On the corporation as legal person, see Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific

R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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Railroad, and an eager supporter of railroad construction.

McWhorter even endorsed West Florida's secession from the state

and incorporation into Alabama if the legislature did not subsid
railroad construction. He eventually resigned from the supreme
court to chair Florida's railroad commission. As for Raney, as an
attorney he represented the state's internal improvement fund
which was designed to help fund railroad construction. He helpe
to negotiate the sale of four million acres of land to Philadelphi
businessman Hamilton Disston, a critical factor in facilitating rai

road expansion in the 1880s. After leaving the supreme cour

Raney became counsel for the Seaboard Air Line Railway.41
The radical potential of the court's ruling cannot be overem-

phasized. In the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases, the United Stat
Supreme Court repudiated a proposition for a substantive du

process right under the federal Constitution similar to that pro
posed by the railroad in Geiger. That decision was still good law
early 1886.42 Moreover, Geiger, although emanating from backwoods Tallahassee, was published just a few months after the mor
celebrated case of In re Jacobs, in which the New York Court o
Appeals, the most important state court in the nation, held a lab
regulation invalid under the state's constitution as an arbitra
deprivation of liberty and property.43 Jacobs is often viewed a
precursor to the development of the doctrine of substantive du
process under the federal constitution. But Geiger could be view
as more sweeping, given that it concerned competing rights to p
tection of property for accidental harm without the complication
of contract and labor regulations.
Geiger triggered a contest over liability standards between th

court and the legislature. The supreme court had expressed
philosophical and constitutional preference for negligence. A

result, Geiger identified the kind of property the supreme court was

most willing to protect. Livestock owners would have an increas
share of the burdens resulting from the new transportation ne
work. As everyone understood, the practical difficulty of provi

railroad negligence in livestock cases-railroad employees we

usually the only human witnesses-made claims less likely or eve

41. Manley et al., The Supreme Court ofFlorida, 261, 266, 275-83; Williamson, Flor
Politics in the Gilded Age, 73-80.

42. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
43. In reJacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
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impossible. The legislature perceived this an

expressed extreme hostility to Geiger, enacting
roads to fence their tracks and making them st
injury "whether [acting] negligently or not" if

quate fencing. The legislature imposed a pro

owner of killed livestock would make a direct
ny for compensation, allowing the claim to be e

ment and lien against the railroad, and pro

railroad failed to pay the claim and it was nece

stock owner to seek enforcement in court that the court should

award the value of the livestock plus 50 percent interest on the
stock from the date of the initial claim, and attorney's fees.
years later, the legislature imposed a presumption of railroad
ligence in livestock cases, further overruling Geiger.44

The supreme court also heard property damage cases af

1865 that did not involve goods on carriers or livestock. Most c

cerned the application of negligence concepts to duties imp

by contract or on a local government. Post-Civil War bailment
putes, for example, tended to be decided in the context of we
established doctrine. In adjudicating liability arising from a h
bailment in Jackson County, in which a man hired a horse but

treated it, the supreme court restated the principle form
applied to slaves that a bailee is required to exercise "ordinary

gence," which is "such as men of common prudence gener

exercise about their own affairs."45 In a dispute invol

Jacksonville, a plaintiff had fallen through the Hogans' C
Bridge and "his buggy was broken, his harness ruined, and

horse seriously injured and rendered unfit for . . use thereaf
The court held that an incorporated municipality could be liab
for injuries on its streets and bridges if its charter included a
to maintain public streets.46 Other property cases addressed t
negligence of an attorney,47 a timber operation that obstructed

44. Revised Statutes of the State of Florida, ss. 2271-76, 2280.

45. West v. Blackshear & Co., 20 Fla. 457 (1884); McMurray v. Bassett, 18 Fl
(1882) (without the permission of its owner, a mare became pregnant wh
being held at the defendant's livery stable).
46. Jacksonville v. Drew, 19 Fla. 106 (1882) (city charged with the control and
ulation of its streets and bridges).

47. Young v. Whitney, 18 Fla. 54 (1881) (negligence unsuccessfully used
defense to paying attorney's fee).
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Escambia River,48 the negligence of a partner in running a business,49 and a fire set by a railroad.50 The last, against the South
Florida Railroad Company in Orange County, involved a railroad's
attempt to burn woods adjacent to its property. The fire spread
and destroyed a house and several orange trees.

Two other property cases addressed negligence concepts in
special business relationships. In O'Brien v. Vaill, decided in 1886,
a man who left a trunk at a St. Johns County hotel-the trunk was

later stolen-claimed the innkeeper was responsible. The court

held that because the man checked out of the hotel and left the

trunk without any compensation to the innkeeper, the hotel
responsible only if it was grossly negligent. Unfortunately for
plaintiff, there were no facts to support such a finding.51

In another dispute, the Western Union Telegraph Comp

failed to deliver a message in Pensacola sent from Barbados. T
message concerned an agreement to hire a vessel in Barbados

would come to Pensacola and carry lumber to the United
Kingdom. Thinking the deal was final, the ship sailed to Pensacola
only to discover that, because its accepting telegram had not been

delivered by Western Union, the shipper hired another ship.
There was no doubt that the failure to deliver the message was negligence. Instead, the question was what damages could be allowed:
the mere cost of sending the telegram or the consequential dam-

ages flowing from the fact that the message was not delivered.
Despite the potential burden on telegraph companies, and a contrary rule in other jurisdictions, the court held that the sender
could recover damages resulting in the usual course of business
from the failure to deliver the message. It affirmed a trial judgment against Western Union for more than $600.52
After the Civil War, property damage cases still made up the
majority of all Florida accident cases. Damages to goods shipped
48. Sullivan v. Jernigan, 21 Fla. 264 (1885) (defense of claim depended partly on
whether there was a breach of "the care, diligence and skill ordinarily exercised by timber raftsmen on the Escambia river"); Simpson & Co. v. Daniels, 16

Fla. 672 (1878) (Blackwater River in Santa Rosa County obstructed by logs,
other logs damaged).
49. Richardson v. Ross, 14 Fla. 463 (1874).
50. Saussy v. South Florida R.R. Co., 22 Fla. 327 (1886) (A verdict for the railroad
was reversed on the grounds that its attorney improperly questioned a witness).

51. O'Brien v. Vaill, 22 Fla. 627 (1886).
52. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hyer Bros., 22 Fla. 637 (1886).
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by common carriers, injuries to livestock by
tained municipal streets, the incompetence o
mistreated by a person other than its owne
timber, goods lost in a hotel, a spreading fi
telegraph message were the factual contexts
With the notable exceptions of the livestock
ed intense debate between the legislature an
and the spreading fire case, all of the claim
in contract performance or the duties of lo
result, accident law concepts in property ca
1886 were predominantly linked to failures
expectations in commercial or government
Despite the continued prominence of prop
there were hints that the greater future of
gence would be with personal injuries. One v

case involved injuries to railroad passenge
passenger case before 1887, which generat

1880s, involved an injury to an elderly man
streetcar.54 Plaintiff Adolpho Chappell, appa

claimed that a streetcar driver started the horse-drawn vehicle in a
manner that shook the car and then threw him to its floor before

he could get seated. He claimed damages of $5,000. In the fir

appeal, a trial verdict for Chappell was reversed on the ground th

there was no proof of negligence. According to the court, t

mere fact of an accident did not establish negligence by the stree
railway, and moreover, the relevant standard was "ordinary car

and prudence." It saw "no proof of such acts or omissions up

the part of the driver as show a failure to observe such care, pr
caution and vigilance as the circumstances demanded-in a wor
no affirmative proof of negligence."55 A new trial was awarded o
appeal, but before the second trial, Chappell died. His wife pu
sued the case and won another verdict in Duval County. Yet,
appeal the court gave a narrow view of the state's wrongful deat

53. An infrequent type of personal injury litigation involved claims against loca

government. A rare decision finding liability against a city arose when lawyers
forJacksonville neglected to file a required bill of exceptions so as to perfec
an appeal; Jacksonville v. Lawson, 16 Fla. 321 (1878) (plaintiff fell into a ditch
54. Jacksonville Street Ry. Co. v. Chappell, 21 Fla. 174 (1885);Jacksonville Street Ry. C

v. Chappell, 22 Fla. 616 (1886).

55. Jacksonville Street Ry. Co. v. Chappell (1885), 21 Fla. at 183-85.
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statute, which permitted certain legal actions to continue a
one's death, in holding that Chappell's action for personal injur

did not survive under the statute. The statute provided th

"Hereafter all actions for personal injuries shall die with the p
son, to wit: assault and batteries, slander, false imprisonment

malicious prosecution, all other actions shall and may be ma
tained in the name of the representative of the deceased."
court read the types of claims after "to wit" to not includ
Chappell's case.56
The supreme court also confronted a personal injury t
pedestrian on railroad tracks. Much as in the livestock area,
legislature had already perceived the potential for this kind

injury and, in 1874, required railroads to erect signs and ring b
at crossings and to not exceed a speed of four miles per hour i

cities.57 The crossing cases were particularly well suited to

defense of "contributory negligence." This rule provided that
negligence-or absence of "ordinary care"-by the plaintiff elim
nated the liability of the railroad, even if the railroad also act
without "ordinary care." A particularly dramatic use of contri
tory negligence was Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Yniestra,
which Moses G. Yniestra, walking along the company's tracks i
Pensacola, was killed. This was the only appeal in Florida betwe
1845 and 1886 involving a claim for negligent personal injury
someone who had no contractual relationship with the defenda
or when the defendant was not a unit of government.58

Yneistra was walking along track through the company

switchyard early in the morning when it was mostly dark. The t
was laid on one of Pensacola's public streets. Yneistra had walke
through the switchyard on his way to and from work for abo
three years. In a backing maneuver, the train, allegedly ringing

56. Jacksonville Street Ry. Co. v. Chappell (1886), 22 Fla. at 625, 627. The cour

not decide whether a case by the representative of a deceased passenge

based on the contract of carriage could survive. It only held that a claim
negligence alone could not. The railroad had argued that "all actions" in th

statute meant all actions, and that the list after "to wit" was simply an illustr
tion of the actions barred, not a restriction. Of course, this rendered the ref

erence to "all other actions" meaningless. The supreme court apparent

agreed; Jacksonville Street Ry. Co. v. Chappell, Florida Supreme Court Fol
0767, Florida State Archives.
57. Revised Statutes of the State of Florida, s. 2264.

58. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886).
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bell and traveling at about three to four mi

Yneistra. Earlier, workers on the train had seen Yneistra on the

track, but there was no light on the back of the train nor was there

any lookout. The only witnesses to the killing were company
employees.59 Judge W. Douglas King instructed an Escambia
County jury on a full range of negligence issues. Was the engine

property equipped? Was the engine run with due care? Did
Yneistra have "plenty of warning"? If the jury believed the railroad
was liable, it should award such damages as the deceased's life was
worth to his wife. The jury found no contributory negligence and
awarded $25,000 to Yneistra's widow, who was left to care for ten
children.60

The supreme court agreed with the lower court ruling that the

company was negligent in not seeing Yniestra walking near the
rear of the train. Yet, citing New York and Pennsylvania law, it con-

cluded that recovery depended on whether the accident was
entirely the fault of the company.61 It held that Yniestra was contributorily negligent because he knew of the property's use as a
switching yard, even though the railroad track on which he was
killed was part of a public street. In essence, the justices accepted
the railroad's argument that Yneistra did not need to walk on the

track, even though it was located on a public road, and consequently rejected the argument that Yneistra had a right to walk on
the road and track and that, as a result, he was not negligent.62
Chief Justice Raney, who wrote the opinion, admitted his unease
about the prospect of a negligent railroad having no liability for
killing a person:

[T]he operation of the principle of contributory negligence is unjust and inequitable. By the law, as it unquestionably stands, no matter how negligently or with what
amount of care trains are run, if a person injured by one
of them has failed to exercise care on his part, he cannot
recover. As it happens in nearly every instance of colli-

sion, if not all, that the person on the track is alone
59. Ibid., 21 Fla. at 723.

60. Yniestra v. Louisville & Nashville R.R Co., File 1884-7818, Escambia County
Clerk's Office, Pensacola, Fla.; Yneistra v. Louisville & Nashville R1R. Co.,

Florida Supreme Court Folder 0809, Florida State Archives.
61. Louisville & Nashville R.R Co. v. Yneistra, 21 Fla. at 729.
62. Yneistra v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., Florida Supreme Court Folder 0809.
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injured or killed, the train receiving no damage, there is
no present incentive of personal safety on the train hands

to use caution, nor a fear of being compelled to make
pecuniary compensation when they can rely upon being
absolved from their admitted negligence by some careless

act of the plaintiff.

Raney endorsed a rule of comparative negligence, which wo

apportion damages based on the relative fault of the parties, b
he thought it was up to the legislature to change the law.63
Chappell and Yniestra were the most important personal inju
appeals in Florida between 1845 and 1886. The supreme court d
not decide any employee injury cases during this time, althoug
such claims became an increasingly important variety of appea

other states.64 Because Chappell and Yniestra both lost th

appeals, the only personal injury verdict in favor of an accident
ly injured plaintiff upheld by the supreme court between 1845
1886 involved a claim againstJacksonville (a place notorious for
poor roads) for a man's fall into a ditch.65 Altogether, the use

negligence to obtain recovery for personal injuries in Flori
before 1886 was extremely rare. None of the normal source
such cases in other states-railroad injuries to passengers, railro
collisions with pedestrians, or injuries to railroad workers-gen
ated many appeals.
Despite the predominance of property cases and the inf
quency of personal injury claims between 1865 and 1886, Florid
was clearly on the path to a modern conceptualization of accide
law. Following a national trend, the supreme court tried to
enshrine negligence as the doctrine that would determine liabi
when there was no prior relationship between the injured
injurer, most notably in the livestock and pedestrian cases.
court relied heavily on the decisions of other states and on leg
writers, freely importing doctrine in concluding that negligen
was the best way to address the problems created by econom
development. Further, it was no accident that almost all of

63. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Yneistra, 21 Fla. at 730, 737-38.
64. An indication that injuries happened, however, is Peninsula Railroad v. Gar
22 Fla. 356 (1886), in which the court discussed the ability of railroad co
pany employees to bind the railroad to agreements entered into with phy
cians for medical services to railroad workers.

65. Jacksonville v. Lawson, 16 Fla. 321 (1878).
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court's personal or property damage cases in

device such as a railroad or telegraph, or

Florida's few urban settings. The legislature

factor in shaping accident law. It realized

watershed had been reached by the mid-1880
willing than the supreme court to view neg

means of assessing responsibility for pe

injuries, particularly in the absence of a con
duty. It adopted a spate of laws that touch
especially for railroads. Many of these statut
the law as developed by the supreme court a
tection to the injured. In 1887, the legislatu

tributory negligence doctrine of Yniestr
apportionment approach of comparative n

ized drunkenness, failure to deliver goods, an

railroad employees. It abolished the fellow

mitted actions by the victims of persons kill
others to survive their death, effectively reje
sion. Further, in 1887 and 1889, the legislat

requirement on railroads and higher than

standards for the killing of livestock. This w
of the court's decision in Geiger. Finally, a re
see railroad rate and service issues, the Railroad Commission, was
established in 1887.66

Nineteenth-century Florida's experience with accidents and
their consequences is not just a subject for lawyers or legal historians. The history reveals broad and important characteristics of the
state's political and economic life. From the beginning, accidents

were linked to problems of technology and urbanization. From
the 1850s through the 1880s, the legislature and the supreme
court tried to fashion rules that would allocate risk according to

the evolving values of the decision makers. Florida's experience
with accident law was unique. Its slow economic development pre66. Revised Statutes of the State of Florida, ss. 2271-76, 2280-84, 2342-44, 2346, 2692-

95. The 1887 legislature also passed the firstJim Crow railroad car law; ibid.,
s. 2268. The legislature had adopted a number of safety statutes in 1874, for
example concerning crossings and prohibiting locking the doors of passenger

cars; Digest of the Laws of the State of Florida, 286-89. A discussion of the contest

over the railroad commission is found in William G. Thomas, Lawyeringfor the
Railroad: Business, Law, and Power in the New South (Baton Rouge, La., 1999),
110-12.
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vented the large numbers of cases that were common in ot
states. There were few supreme court accident decisions bef
the mid-1880s that were not based on a contractual relations

between the injured and injurer. And property damage cases, n

personal injury cases, dominated litigation into the mid-18

Also important is that the legislature preferred strict liability
some factual contexts and specific liability standards in others t

tended to increase burdens on injurers, especially railroads

modified or rejected key supreme court rulings in order to prot

persons and property other than railroads. In contrast, th
supreme court embraced the negligence standard, with its
requirement of fault. When given the opportunity, the court
imposed a full spectrum of negligence rules and defenses from
other states, even giving those rules a level of constitutional significance in Geiger. By the late 1880s, Florida possessed a robust body
of statutory and court-created rules for accidental property and

personal injury. Above all, the rules showed that industrial
progress had real costs and that Florida's lawmakers sometimes disagreed about who should bear those costs. In fact, the question of

an appropriate allocation of burdens for accidental injury has
proved to be so intractable-and inherently political-that it continued to generate disagreement into the twentieth century and
beyond.

